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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BIL\ SHEU ~IOTOR AND FIX AXCE CO~IPANY, IXC., a Ctah
eorporation,
Plai11tiff and Respondent,
YS.

GEORGE ANDERSON, SELECT
C~\HS. IXC., a Utah corporation, awl
T<>XY CHAPMAN,

Case No.
10821

Defendants and A]Jpcllwds.

Plaintiff's and Respondent's Brief

INTRODCCTORY COl\Il\IENTS
Respondent is in accord with the Statement of the
Kirnl of Case and Statement of Facts, with the exception of the following particulars:
In the Statement of the Kind of Case, Appellant
indicates that the action is brought by the plaintiff corporation against George Anderson, the president of
Select Cars, Inc., which is incorrect. The action is
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brought against George Anderson, an indiYitlua]
against Select Cars, Inc., a Utah corporation, and Tony
Chapman. The remaining statement is accurate.
I

Within the Statement of Facts, the Appellant
alleges the purpose of an affidavit which has been introduced in evidence as Exhibit 1-P was merely to set
forth a specimen signature which was authorized by
the Appellant Anderson. 'fhe purpose of said document, as set forth in the testimony, was primarily for
the establishment of personal liability for all obligations incurred by George Anderson or Tony Chapman
or Select Cars, Inc., in connection with the aforesaid
parties operating as Select Cars, Inc.
The transcript of proceedings on Page 62, lines
24 through 27; Page 63, lines 11 through 13; on an
unnumbered page between pages 66 and 67 at lines
23-27 ;and on page 68, lines 9-10, all set forth in testimony the purpose of Exhibit 1-P was to establish
personal liability on the part of George Anderson for
all extensions of credit to Select Cars, Inc.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
(a) STATEMENT OF LA\V RELATIVE
TO INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
AND EVIDENCE INDICATING PARTIES
RESPONSIBLE FOR DRAFTING OF PRIME
DOCUMENT.
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Respondent agrees with the Appellant's statement
of the law set forth on page 8 of Appellants' Brief,
a[J(l eites the following case in harmony with said proposition: Bryant vs. Deseret News Publishing Co., 233
P. 2d 355, which states:
(1~clJ.?..ii1)

"Doubtful ambiguous terms and contract
should be interpreted ar;ainst the party who has
chosen the terms." (Emphasis added).
This rule of law is further cited in Huber and
Howland Construction Company vs. City of South Salt
Lake, 7 Vtah 2d 273, 32::3 P. 2d 258, and in Seal vs.
Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P. 2d 503.
The rule of law not being in dispute between the
parties, the Respondent refers to the transcript of
proceedings on page fi2, line 30, wherein the president
of the Plaintiff-Respondent corporation stated:
"_Mr. Anderson (Appellant) and I together
wrote up the agreement you mentioned." (Agreement refers to Exhibit 1-P.)
On page 68, lines 11 through 16, witness Myron
Horne testified that he was present during the discussion between the parties and indicated a joint effort
resulted in the preparation of the document shown as
Exhibit 1-P. The Defend_flnt-Appellant, George Anderson, stated under cross-examination (page 88, lines
17 through 20) that the document noted as Exhibit
1-P was discussed "back and forth" between the parties, showing that in fact said document was prepared
by both the Appellant and the Respondent. Under
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the above mentioned rule of interpretation, it would
seem that, at the very least, the document should not
be interpreted against the Respondent.
Exhibit 6-D shows a draft copy of Exhibit 1-P,
and the Appellant states relative to said exhibit at
page 83, line 12 of the transcript, that certain terminology written on said draft, Exhibit 6-D, in ink, was
made by him specifically. Said terminology is as follows:
" . . .and both of us shall be bound by the signature of either of us." (Referring to himself and
Tony Chapman).
Under the rules of interpretation as above cited,
it would appear that such terminology would have to
be interpreted most harshly against the Appellant,
although in any event there is little question as to the
assumption of personal liability as indicated by said
statement.
It should be further noted that Exhibit 1-P as set
forth by the Appellant in his brief does not fairly set
forth the facts as indicated in said Exhibit, the difference being that the document as typed, both in draft
(Exhibit 6-D) and in its final form (Exhibit 1-P) ,
shows a signature line only for George Anderson,
with no title or any indication of signature by Select
Cars, Inc. The words "Select Cars, Inc.," are in handwriting above the name of George Anderson, with
George Anderson's signature with the designation
"Pres" following his name, all in Mr. Anderson's own
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handwriting. There can be 110 doubt of both parties
participating in the drafting of Exhibit 1-P.

(b) STATE~IENT OF LA,¥ RELATIVE
TO AMBIGUITY ESTABLISHING PERSONAL LIAlHLITY ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 'VHETHER INTERPRETED 'VITHIN THE .FOUR CORNERS
OF THE DOCUMENT IF NOT AMBIGUOUS,
AXD THE ALLO"r ANCE OF P AROL EVIDEXCE IF Al\IBIGUOUS.
Respondent acknowledges the cases set forth in
Appellant's Point I, and agrees with the general rule
of law set forth therein to the effect that a document
should, wherever possible, be interpreted within the
four corners of the document, said rule being more
fully set forth in the case of Mathis vs ..Madsen, 1 U. 2d
46, 261 P.2d 952.
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule
is to determine what the parties intended by what
they said. The Court may not add, ignore or
discard words in the process but attempt to
render certain the meaning of the provision in
dispute by an objective and reasonable construction of the whole contract."
In the case of 'Villiam R. Clyde vs. Eddington
Canning Company and ,V. R. Eddington, 10 Utah 2d
H, 347 P.2d 563, a letter of guarantee was written which
stated within the body:
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"This is to certify that I, personally, will
guarantee you payment for any tomatoes you
raise and deliver for us, or any other crop contracted for, on the day contract specifies for pay.
ment.
"Very truly yours,
"Eddington Canning Company
"Isl
R. Eddington
"'V. R. Eddington"

' T·

The Defendant in this case contended that by
signing the letter in the form indica~fd it was not his
intention to be bound personally, which he also averred
to in an affidavit. The Court, however, was not persuaded, inasmuch as it appeared the clear language
of the writing did not impress such contention. 'Vherefore, it would appear in the present matter there was
no question as to intent within the body of the letter
in creating personal liability on the Appellant, and
should an ambiguity arise, it was by virtue of the
manner in which the signature was affixed. In the
event the Court should determine that Exhibit 1-P
is, in fact, ambiguous, then the cases are clear that
extrinsic and parol evidence may be used to determine
the intent of the parties. See Milford State Bank vs.
'Vest Field Canal and Irigation Company, et al.,
Blackner vs. 'Vest Field Canal and Irrigation Company, 108 U. 528, 162 P.2d 101.
"Ordinarily the intention of the parties to a
written contract must be determined by an examination of the writing, but if a phrase or a
part of a written agreement is ambiguous and
the intention of the parties cannot be determined
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from the writing itself, parol evidence is admissible to show the intention of the parties."
The Appellant relies upon the issues as set forth
in the pre-trial order without any objection, but now
contends said issues are improper. Said pre-trial order
established a necessity of testimony to clear the ambiguity set forth in Exhibit 1-P.

POINT II.
ATTORNEY'S FEES MAY BE ALLOWED
\YITHOUT SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE
\iVHERE THEY ARE NOT AT ISSUE.
Appellant relies upon Title 78-37-9, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, for his rejection of allowance of
attorney's fees, which the Respondent deems inappropriately cited as said provision relates to attorneys'
fees in foreclosure actions, which is not the case in point.
It is conceded, however, that no evidence was introduced relative to an award of attorneys' fees, which
under Utah law is required in the event said fees are
at issue. This is the general rule of law as set forth
in the case of F.M.A. Financial Corporation, a corporation, vs. Build, Inc., a corporation, et al., 17 Utah
2d 80, 404 P. 2d 670, which states where attorneys'
fees are an issue of fact, it is necessary part of the
plaintiff's case, which he has the burden of proving.
\Vhere attorneys' fees are not at issue, however, the
above referenced case states:
7

. "Because both judges and la":yers have spe.
cial knowledge as to the value of legal services.
this is not always required to be proved by sworn
testimony. It is sometimes submitted upon stipu.
lation: as to amount; or that the Judge may fix
it on the basis of his own knowledge and experience; and/or in connection with reference to a
Bar approved schedule. Any one of these would
have provided an evidenciary basis for making
the determination."
Inasmuch as there is no issue of fact as to attorney's
fees, the Appellant having failed to bring said fees into
issue in his Second Amended Complaint, and relying
upon the issues as set forth in the pre-trial order,
which does not put at issue said attorneys' fees, Respondent contends that the determination of attorneys'
fees in a matter strictly within the province of the trial
court, and no additional evidence to establish the same
is required.
Respondent further contends that, pursuant to
Rule 8 ( d) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
"Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required other than those to the
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied
in the responsive pleading."
The Appellant in his Second Amended Answer
in this matter, which is the controlling answer in the
present case, raises no issue as to attorneys' fees. There
is a general reliance upon the issues as established
by the pre-trial order by the Appellant. However, here
again no issue was raised as to attorney's fees. A responsive pleading was required pursuant to the above
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cited rule. There being none made, a reasonable attorneys' fee is admitted and should be allowed as set .forth
in the ~~.1\1.C. Financial Corporation case, supra.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent submits that the decision of the
trial court holding that the agreement between the
parties hereto was ambiguous and thereby requiring
extrinsic and parol evidence to determine the intention
of the parties was correct, and that the evidence submitted by parol proved clearly and convincingly the
intent of the parties, and in fact created a personal
liability on the part of the Appellant. In any event,
the intent of the parties as shown within the four
corners of the document was such as to require a finding
of personal liability on the part of the Appellant. Attorneys' fees as provided in the order of the Court were
proper and correct inasmuch as the matter of attorneys'
fees was not put at issue by the answer of the Appellant
nor by the pre-trial order and was raised for the first
time on appeal, and can only be considered admitted by
the failure of the Appellant to otherwise plead.
Respectfully submitted,
DUANE B. WELLING of
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND TAYLOR
1311 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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